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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
astrological conditions prevailing at the time of the operation; that he had
determined that an operation at such time was particularly hazardous; and
that he had informed the jury of his conclusions just prior to its vote on the
verdict. The trial court overruled the plaintiff's motion. On appeal on
questions of law, the court of appeals held that it is against public policy to
permit a juror to testify as to his conduct or that of other jurors during the
time the jury was deliberating upon its verdict, and that the rule is deemed
so basic that it is applicable even in cases where such evidence tends to show
that a juror made an independent investigation upon matters which he
deemed persuasive in arriving at a verdict.
Although there are cases to the contrary in a few jurisdictions, the hold-
ing in the principal case is in line with numerous decisions of the Supreme
Court of Ohio.
Judicial Notice
In Nelson v. Van Horn Constructwon Co.18 the plaintiff appealed from
an adverse ruling of the Board of Review of the Ouo Bureau of Unem-
ployment Compensation which held that he had not established his eligi-
bility for unemployment benefits. In reversing this ruling and granting
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court held that he had actively sought
employment but that it was not available on account of economic condi-
tions then prevailing.
It is the general rule that state courts will take judicial notice of ad-
ministrative rules, regulations and bulletins of considerable notoriety estab-
lished and published by state and federal boards and commissions, and by
state and federal executive departments1 9 Accordingly, the court in the
principal case rightly held that the information contained in the Labor
Market Informatn, a regular official publication of the Department of
Research and Statistics of the State Bureau of Unemployment Compensa-
tion, could be judicially noticed by it.
CL NTON DEWirr
FUTURE INTERESTS
In Corry v. Central Methodist Charch of Sprzrgfield' a testatrix gave
property "to my nieces K and M or the survivor of them." The residuary
clause of the testatrix's will provided "in the event that either of my nieces
K and M, shall predecease me, then in such event,, the mece so surviving
shall have the entire part of my estate. "The court of appeals properly
- 102 NE.2d 57 (Trumbull Com. PL 1951).
'Boone v. State, 109 Ohio St. 1, 141 N.E. 841 (1923)
[Spring
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construed the will as a whole and held that the words "or the survivor of
them" meant surviving the testatrix. Consequently upon the death of one
of the nieces after the testatrn's death, the property received from testatrix
passed under the deceased niece's will.
In Braun v. Central Trust Co.2 a testator provided for a marital trust and
a residuary trust in order to obtain the maximum benefits of the marital
deduction. The testator used a formula marital deduction clause that re-
quired his executor to designate the specific property that would be held
under the marital trust. In making this selection the executor was restricted
to property which would qualify for a marital deduction under the federal
estate tax. Upon a refusal of the executor to bring an action to have the
will construed, the testator's two daughters sued to ascertain whether the
marital deduction clause violated the Rule against Perpetuites. They con-
tended that the provisions of the will setting up the two trusts violated the
Rule against PerpetutAes because the selection of the property for the
marital trust was a condition precedent to the vesting of the legal title in
the trustee. The court of appeals, in affirming the common pleas court's
decision,3 held that the title of the trustee was not subject to a condition
precedent; %.e., the executor's selection of the property that would be the
subject of the trust. Therefore, the provision of the will providing for the
marital trust and the residuary trust did not violate the Rule against Per-
petuities.
Ordinarily ai interest that is not vested for purposes other than the ap-
plication of the Rule against Perpetuties is also not vested under the Rule.'
Interests such as possibilities of reverter are not vested in the general
sense,5 but they are considered as vested under the Rule against Perpetui-
ties.' The decisions holding that possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry are vested interests under the Rule against Perpettuties are unsound7
and do not justify increasing the areas of the law in which interests subject
to a condition precedent are considered vested under the Rule against Per-
peumities.
An interest in property is dearly subject to a condition precedent when
the person who is to have the interest will be ascertained upon the occur-
'104 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio App. 1950).
'92 Ohio App. 110, 109 N.E.2d 476 (1952).
* 104 N.E.2d 480 (Hamilton Com. Pl. 1951).
46 AM. LAW OF ProPERTY f§ 24.18, 24.62 (1952); 1 SIMEs, FtJTURE INTERS
§ 40 (1936).
"'A possibility of reverter is any reversionary interest which is subject to a condi-
ton precedent." RSTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 154(3) (1936).
'6 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.62 (1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 372
(1944); 2 SnMEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 507 (1936).
" 6 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.62 (1952).
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